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Christian Coseru 
Perception, 
Causally Efficacious 
Particulars, and the Range of 
Phenomenal Consciousness 
Reply to Commentaries 
Many thanks to the contributors for their thorough and thoughtful 
commentaries on my book, Perceiving Reality, and for the opportu-
nity they gave me to clarify and elaborate my views. In what follows, 
I will do my best to address their objections and concerns, many of 
which move the discussion forward in significant ways. I shall 
respond to each contributor in alphabetical order. (Unless otherwise 
noted, all parenthetical page references are to Perceiving Reality.) 
Laura Guerrero 
Guerrero focuses on the metaphysics of causation, and its role in the 
broader question of whether the ‘two truths’ framework of Buddhist 
philosophy can be reconciled with the claim that science provides the 
best account of our experienced world. She finds my account of 
phenomenological naturalism compelling but thinks that interpreting it 
as a causal theory of knowledge is problematic. Following Alvin 
Goldman (1999), Guerrero argues that causal theories of knowledge 
underscore ontological realism and commitment to a correspondence 
theory of truth that works against the embodied account of knowledge 
that I develop. I welcome this proposal since it invites further 
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56 C.  COSERU 
reflection on how best to understand the efficacy of our cognitive pro-
cesses and their epistemic status. 
1. Proposal for a Buddhist Causal Account of Knowledge 
A central feature of the Buddhist epistemological programme (and of 
Indian epistemologies in general) is the grounding of belief in causal 
accounts of belief formation. This naturalist tendency, as I argue at 
length in Chapters 2, 4, and 6, aligns Buddhist epistemology with 
recent efforts to understand cognition in embodied and causal terms. 
Metaphysical considerations, of course, are never altogether absent 
from the scene, but the debate often centres on basic issues of defi-
nition, given the range of views, for instance, about the cognitive 
function of perception, and the relation between perception and con-
ception. Thus, when the Buddhist epistemologists reject realist defi-
nitions of perception (that is, perception as the apprehension of spatio-
temporal entities possessed of intrinsic properties), they do so because 
such definitions attribute to perception capacities that are beyond its 
reach (see pp. 141–54 — for similar concerns in contemporary 
philosophy of perception see Bayne, 2009, and Siegel, 20006). Per-
ception does not provide transparent access to a world of self 
characterized entities. Rather, it apprehends particulars as uniquely 
characterized and as affording different opportunities for action. 
One of my aims in Perceiving Reality is to show how accounts of 
perception informed by metaphysical realism can be problematic on 
both metaphysical and epistemological grounds, especially when 
relying — as they typically do — on conceptions of consciousness 
that ignore its properly phenomenological features. Claiming, as do 
the Indian realists (the Naiyāyikas), that consciousness intends the 
external object directly has to contend with cases of illusory objects. 
The possibility of illusory cognitions, however, is not the only prob-
lem externalist conceptions of intentionality face. By separating 
phenomenal character from intentionality, they also face the problem 
of knowledge intimation, of explaining just how the cognition of an 
object is itself known. 
On the causal model of cognition I develop, intentionality and 
phenomenality are structural, yet adaptive features of consciousness 
itself, and reflect the embodied character of cognition. The first cap-
tures the content or objectual aspect of each instance of cognitive 
awareness, the fact that each perception, judgment, memory, etc. is 
about a specific object of its own. The second is constitutive of the 
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 REPLY  TO  COMMENTARIES 57 
cognizing subject’s sense that the respective mental state is his or her 
own, that it happens in their mental stream. This causal model has 
important consequences for theories of inference, and for proposed 
solutions to the problem of induction. 
Take, for instance, Dignāga’s attempt to solve the problem of 
induction by grounding the logical proof in the observation and non-
observation of occurring associations and dissociations. While it could 
serve as a viable model for evidence or cased-based reasoning, it does 
not explain how the cognitive equivalence of sentences is possible 
given the difference between universal statements and those express-
ing particular states of affairs. For this reason, his successor, 
Dharmakīrti, demands a stronger foundation for the connection 
between the reason (hetu) and the position stated (pakṣa), specifically 
one capable of explaining the evidence–subject relation 
(pakṣadharmatā), that is, the relation between the subject of an 
inference and the reason adduced in its support. 
Consider one of the most common examples of inferential reasoning 
in the literature: ‘Sound is impermanent because it is a product, like a 
pot.’ Three components are at work in this model of inferential 
reasoning: the subject (‘sound’), the predicate (‘is impermanent’), and 
the reason (‘because it is a product’). In order for the reason to be 
considered valid the following three criteria must be satisfied: (i) the 
subject must have the property of the reason (e.g. all sounds must be 
products); (ii) the reason must pervade all instances of the predicate 
(e.g. all impermanent things must be products); and (iii) there can be 
no conceivable instance of the reason that is not also a predicate (e.g. 
there are no products that are not impermanent things). 
 The question is: what specifically counts as the evidence for this 
thesis? On what grounds do we assert the nature of ‘being a product’? 
The tripartite model I have just sketched, it seems, is inadequate, for it 
does not account for how judgments of the sort ‘being a product’ 
come to serve as evidential reason in a given circumstance. Is ‘being a 
product’ a unique particular? Is it a relational property of things (a 
universal)? Given metaphysical commitment to the principles of 
dependent arising and momentariness, the most obvious solution is to 
treat such instances as tropes. Particulars (as tropes) are not simply the 
entities disclosed by perceptual awareness. Rather, they are the causal 
properties or powers that occasion different types of experience. The 
‘thirst-quenching’ property of water is a causal power of water 
drinking or water metabolism. On a trope-theoretical model, these 
unique properties of particulars are themselves particulars, for each 
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58 C.  COSERU 
instance of liquidity, blueness, or aggregation is typical to the specific 
and unique circumstances in which it occurs (see Goodman, 2004; 
Tillemans, 2011; and Coseru, forthcoming). 
Guerrero rightly observes that ‘given their strange nature’ how these 
unique particulars ‘serve as the truth-makers for perceptual repre-
sentations is also distinctive’. But she thinks that, despite their 
distinctiveness, ‘there does appear to be a clear correspondence-type 
understanding of what makes a cognition veridical’. 
The correspondence, in this case, is between the veridicality of 
cognition (that is, its epistemic status) and the multiple cognitive 
instances that occasion it (e.g. thirst-quenching is a property of most 
drinks with a high water content). Guerrero cites and endorses 
Dharmakīrti’s view that ‘objects that differ in nature… can still have 
similar effects’, using the example of different medicinal plants with 
the same curative effects. But she thinks that we run into explanatory 
difficulties when we try to make sense of how an infinite plurality of 
distinct causes can have the same determinate effect. That is because 
‘the cognitive processes or engaged practices at work in the externalist 
account’ and ‘the nature of the objects to which the cognitive subject 
is in constant embodied engagement with’ lack fitness. In other words, 
the principle of momentariness prevents the cognitive process from 
sharing any features with the objects it apprehends. 
I agree with Guerrero that the presence of a multiplicity of factors 
that can be reliably represented as yielding a given vertical cognition 
poses problems for causal theories of knowledge. But if the true mark 
of the real, as Dharmakīrti insists, is its capacity to produce an effect 
(see Pandeya, 1989, p. 84), then we need not worry about the multiple 
realizability of veridical states of cognitive awareness. They reflect 
not the ontological status of the properties, states, or events that 
occasion them, but their pragmatic efficacy. I know water through 
liquid-ingesting, quench-satisfying experiences. I also know water 
through immersive, floating, cleansing, and fire-extinguishing experi-
ences. That different causal chains can in principle prompt quenching 
experiences is no reason of concern for naturalist accounts of belief 
formation. The question, of course, is how water transmits its fluid 
dynamics and quenching properties to a subject, and whether these 
properties, whose intentional content is constituted by the phenom-
enology, can be described in efficient-causal terms. 
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 REPLY  TO  COMMENTARIES 59 
2. Cognition, Causality, and the Question of Ontological 
Irreducibility 
A more pressing objection is that the causal theory of knowledge I 
advance on behalf of the Buddhist epistemologists is at odds with the 
prevailing view that, given scholastic affiliations with the positions of 
either Yogācāra or Madhyamaka (in the case of Śāntarakṣita and 
Kamalaśīla), their metaphysical commitments rest with either idealism 
or anti-realism. Therefore, writes Guerrero, ‘it seems prima facie 
[original emphasis] odd to attribute to these philosophers an 
externalist account of knowledge’. 
First, what I explicitly attribute to these philosophers is what I call, 
borrowing a term from Keijzer and Schouten (2007, p. 114), process 
externalism: the view that perceptual and inferential cognitions 
depend on, or are continuous with, bodily processes that extend into 
the environment by virtue of the tight relations between perception 
and action. Second, I argue that this account has the added virtue of 
helping to steer clear of the typical conundrum of metaphysical 
interpretations. The question of how someone like Dharmakīrti can 
seemingly argue for both external realism and epistemic idealism (see 
Dreyfus, 1997; and Dunne, 2004) — namely, the view that all entities 
that are present to awareness, including those that are seemingly extra-
mental, are nothing but aspects of cognition — has thus been avoided. 
My case for process externalism, or what Clark and Chalmers 
(1998) call ‘active externalism’, is built on an analysis of 
Dharmakīrti’s so-called kāryānumāna argument, that is, the argument 
that an inference is sound only when one infers from the effect to the 
cause and not vice versa. The argument turns on the question of 
whether a careful inspection of the effect can lead to ascertaining the 
unique causal totality that is its source. How does the order of the 
causal domain establish the sort of evidence that can serve as a 
warrant for sound inference and, at the same time, rule out instances 
of erratic attribution of a connection between evidence and the 
property to be proven? To answer this question, Dharmakīrti avails 
himself of various examples of things that are ordinarily thought of in 
conjunction: the act of speaking and passion, rice and cooking, a 
living body and breathing, perceptual awareness and the senses, and 
such stock examples as fire and smoke. The question is: what sort of 
properties, whether observed or unobserved, in similar or dissimilar 
cases, can be counted as evidence for asserting a given thesis? And 
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60 C.  COSERU 
how are such properties ascertained? That is, how does one come to 
know the truth of the major premise? 
Take the example of rice and cooking. Non-observation in dis-
similar cases does not provide sufficient grounds for sound inference 
either: even though one may observe grains of rice cooking in a 
cauldron, one cannot thereby infer that all grains of rice are cooked 
simply because they are in the cauldron. Indeed, some may be 
uncooked (see Pandeya, 1989, p. 67; and Hayes and Gillon, 2008). 
Can we avoid the risk that there could be unobserved instances to the 
contrary, given that observation of a relation between things at a given 
place and time does not necessarily guarantee that the same relation 
will obtain in other places and at other times? The solution to this 
conundrum is appeal to rules of reasoning that best reflect the nature 
of causally efficient entities: that is, to the so-called natural relation 
(svabhāva-pratibandha) between the properties of an inference. And 
this strategy requires that, in turn, we reflect not from cause to effect, 
not even from a causal totality to an effect, but from effect to the 
cause, because only causes so inferred are in tight proximity to their 
effects. The strategy of naturalization I favour, therefore, grounds this 
model of effective cognition on two things (see pp. 114–6): (a) 
empirical evidence that the reason acquired its evidential status as a 
result of factors that are inherent to our cognitive architecture, 
specifically to information processing systems that translate per-
ceptual content into action; and (b) theoretically robust accounts of 
how intentional content, as the subjective basis for reasoning, 
translates into the successful accomplishment of desired ends (see p. 
115). 
In Perceiving Reality I argue that human cognitive processes have 
evolved to provide effective and meaningful interaction with the 
environment, and thus to maximize both the observational and pre-
dictive skills necessary for survival. The notion that cognition is 
effective in so far as it is produced in the right way — which is the 
hallmark of the Indian philosophical tradition (see Mohanty, 2000, p. 
149; Matilil, 1986, p. 105) — is widely shared by embodied and 
enactive approaches to cognition (see Varela, Thompson and Rosch, 
1991; Hutchins, 1995; Clark, 1998; Hurley, 1998; Noë, 2004; 
Gallagher, 2006; Thompson, 2007). As developed under the guise of 
phenomenological naturalism, this approach states that cognitive 
processes involving perception are not entirely internal but rather co-
constituted by factors that extend into the environment. 
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 REPLY  TO  COMMENTARIES 61 
3. Phenomenological Naturalism: A Conventional or Ultimate 
Account? 
Guerrero also raises questions about the epistemic status of my 
phenomenological naturalism: is this meant to be an ultimate 
epistemological position or merely a statement about our mundane 
cognitive practices? Considering the threat of ‘epistemological 
nihilism’ inherent in the view (common among Buddhist philosophers 
who endorse a dialectical move from conventional to ultimate truth) 
that all positions are only provisionally held, where does that leave 
phenomenological naturalism? The conventional view, as Guerrero 
clarifies, reflects the Buddhist principle of dependent arising, which 
postulates that all phenomena, including states of cognitive awareness, 
arise in dependence upon a multiplicity of causes and conditions and 
do not endure for any length of time. Because objects and the cog-
nitive processes that instantiate them lack intrinsic properties, and are 
in a perpetual state of flux, any theory of knowledge that purports to 
offer us reliable access to what there is, is conventional at best. 
Phenomenological naturalism, which endorses both causal and consti-
tutive accounts of cognition, runs against this view that the causal 
powers of objects are merely conventional attributions. 
At stake is the issue of whether the causes and conditions that 
underpin the Buddhist principle of dependent arising are metaphysical 
features of ultimate reality or conventional designations that reflect 
human interests and practices. It should be clear from my framing of 
the Buddhist epistemological programme in terms of the efficacy of 
our epistemic practices that I dispute the usefulness of the two truths 
dialectic. Just what it means to say that something true in one sense is 
characterized as entirely false in another sense is a vexed question in 
Buddhist philosophy. Claiming, as some Mādhyamika philosophers 
do, that the conventional level of description lacks ultimate epistemic 
standing is problematic, if only because such assertions can only be 
made from the standpoint of the truth that defines what it means to 
lack such standing. One cannot understand the difference between a 
true oasis and only a mirage if the question of what gets to be (and be 
thus called) an oasis is not settled first. That is, we cannot overcome 
the pure conventionalism of the first dialectical step without doing 
some epistemology first. Indeed, as Mark Siderits has convincingly 
argued, without some account of how ‘true and false cognitions differ 
in their etiology’ (Siderits, 2011, p. 178) there is little scope for miti-
gating conventionalism — the view that how things appear to us 
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62 C.  COSERU 
depends on whatever system of conventions ordinary practice has set 
in place (the conventions by which we get to call something ‘white’ 
and ‘a shell’). 
While I appreciate Guerrero’s attempt to defend, following Garfield 
(2015), a view of causal relations as ‘thoroughly conventional’ — 
because the alleged ‘perceived regularity’ on which they depend 
reflects the shared interests and conceptual practices of a particular 
philosophical community — I worry about the consequences of this 
conventionalist approach for our understanding of the causal powers 
of perception itself. My plea for phenomenologically accurate 
descriptions of our experienced world is also an invitation to adopt a 
trope-theoretical approach to epistemology that resists the pressure of 
ontological commitments. However, the naturalism I defend requires 
that we take seriously the efficacy of our epistemic practices and 
allow for an expanded conception of ‘nature’ where material and 
formal categories are seamlessly interwoven. This liberal conception 
of nature acknowledges the ontological complexity of our world of 
experience, while remaining non-committal about the ultimate sub-
stratum of things. 
Guerrero is right to interpret my phenomenological naturalism ‘as 
simply a claim about what we have reason to believe is our best 
scientific theory about the nature of consciousness and the positive 
role Buddhist epistemology can play in articulating this theory’. But 
calling it simply a conventional view that makes no claim to ‘reveal 
the way things ultimately are’ assumes our reasoned deliberations 
about what there is, and how it can be known, lack normative force. 
There is nothing ordinary about mapping out the structure of con-
sciousness or, for that matter, about the biological and cognitive pro-
cesses that underlie it. For the Buddhist epistemologists, our epistemic 
practices do not simply disclose a domain of conventionally 
designated entities. Rather, when expertly deployed, they become the 
means by which we effectively enact our lived world. In so far as that 
(chiefly Madhyamaka) dialectical step to the ultimate truth collapses 
the distinction between what is true and what merely appears to be 
true, we are left with a quietism that is unable to sustain our pragmatic 
ends. 
Let me clarify: Dharmakīrti and his successors do indeed claim that 
the language of ‘causation’ and ‘entities’ reflects conventional prac-
tices of categorization. But while it is true that entities are posited only 
in so far as they are part of a causal nexus, they are ultimately real 
only to the extent that they are practically efficacious. That is, there 
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) I
m
pr
int
 A
ca
de
m
ic 
20
13
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nly
 --
 n
ot
 fo
r r
ep
ro
du
cti
on
 
 REPLY  TO  COMMENTARIES 63 
are no uncaused entities in the Buddhist epistemologist’s ultimate 
ontology. Can we advance on behalf of Dharmakīrti a causal theory of 
knowledge that does not rest on self-justifying basic empirical beliefs? 
That is, can the causal account serve as a basis for the sort of 
naturalism that can accommodate the efficacy of our epistemic 
practices? 
In Chapter 2 I argue that embodied and enactive accounts of cog-
nition see nature not simply as a domain of externally related entities 
and processes, but as structures that are ‘irreducibly relational and 
immanently purposeful’ (see Thompson, 2007, p. 353). Such non-
reductive naturalism is both scientifically informed and phenomeno-
logically constraining: it tells us that the relations between various 
phenomena are not merely naïve correlations but patterns of regularity 
with predictive force. Take a prototypical example from evolutionary 
biology: changes in the anatomy of the hand and thumb, for instance, 
support the phenomenological notion of maximum, or in this case 
precision, grip. On the picture I’m presenting here, phenomenological 
naturalism is not a conventional view, but an ineliminable stance that, 
pace Guerrero, lends the descriptive account its explanatory force and 
supports its normative conclusions. Such descriptions may borrow 
from the Scientific Image the language of causal explanation, but they 
retain the significance and meaningfulness of the Manifest Image. 
4. Does Phenomenology Eschew Foundationalism? 
Finally, on the issue of foundationalism and causal theories of knowl-
edge, Guerrero, of course, is right to point out that ‘not all founda-
tionalist theories are concerned with justification’. Indeed, reliabilist 
and causal theories of knowledge retain the foundationalist structure 
without appealing to the justification of beliefs (Siegel, 2006; 
Shoemaker, 2006). The claim here is that one knows in so far as one 
stands in the right sort of epistemic relation to a given state of affairs, 
regardless of whether the underlying causal factors are transparent to 
the subject. But Guerrero proposes that we reverse the relationship 
between the efficacy of our epistemic practices and the positing of 
causally efficacious entities: things do not lead to successful practice 
because they are real; rather, the experience of pragmatic efficacy 
‘precedes and explains’ the causally efficacious entities thus posed. I 
am sympathetic to this proposal, which is both in keeping with the 
view (going back to Dharmakīrti) that we are better off inferring from 
the effect to the cause (rather than the other way around), and 
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64 C.  COSERU 
illustrative of the pragmatic orientation of my project. I am less con-
vinced, however, that this pragmatic orientation cannot also serve as 
an ‘ultimate epistemological justification’. 
In the final chapter of Perceiving Reality (see especially §9.2), I 
argue that what is ‘ultimate’ need not be thought about in such 
dialectically opposite term. In my plea for epistemological optimism I 
argue that our attentive capacity (manaskāra), which Buddhist con-
templatives have explored at length, ‘makes a certain dimension of 
human cognition not merely the effect of causal chains in the physical 
domain but also a cause in its own right in the domain of cognition’ 
(p. 289). That this self-intimating aspect of cognition could intend a 
given object of experience (say, a column of smoke), despite it being 
prompted by a deficient cause (in this case, a dust column), I take it, 
serves as proof that consciousness can be neither entirely grounded in, 
nor explainable in terms of, physical elements and processes. Phenom-
enological naturalism thus offers an understanding of the relationship 
between the irreducibly presentational character of conscious appre-
hension and causal generation that provides an alternative to reductive 
physicalist models. 
5. Conclusion: Should Epistemological Optimism Be Tempered? 
Whether the ‘two truths’ dialectic calls for a more tempered epistemo-
logical optimism remains, as I noted above, an open question. 
Although we can and have made good progress in carving nature at its 
joints, Guerrero urges that we not lose sight of the conventional status 
of either science or phenomenology. Does that mean the explanatory 
priority that causal theories of knowledge and descriptive accounts of 
experience are compromised? No, if our ‘conventional’ conception of 
truth reflects our practical, effective engagement with situations and 
things rather than naïve realist assumptions about what there is. 
Furthermore, reversing the relation between pragmatic efficacy and 
causal generation does not make causal explanation conventional: it 
merely suggests that an explanation of phenomena must reflect the 
nomological nature of causally efficient things. 
In Perceiving Reality I leave open the possibility that causality in 
the mental domain rests on principles of intelligibility, rather than on 
principles of mechanism: I do, however, claim that the dominant 
direction in the Buddhist epistemological account of cognition points 
toward a naturalistic explanation of perception, intentionality, and 
reference. 
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Matt MacKenzie 
MacKenzie turns the spotlight on what is perhaps the most ambitious 
part of the book: the reflexivist dual-aspect model of consciousness, 
which I develop in Chapter 8 drawing on the works of Dignāga, 
Dharmakīrti, and Śāntarakṣita. This model, which serves as foil for an 
account of the various relations that obtain between perception, 
intentionality, and self-awareness, shares certain structural features 
with models of consciousness put forward by Brentano (1874/1973), 
Husserl (1983), Sartre (1967), and more recently by Zahavi (2006), 
Janzen (2008), and Kriegel (2009). 
Just because there are structural affinities between the conception of 
consciousness at work in Buddhist epistemology and similar con-
ceptions in western philosophy does not mean that there is mutual 
cross-cultural validation. The presence of alternative models of con-
sciousness, specifically as put forth by Mādhyamika thinkers like 
Candrakīrti, who align more closely with the higher-order thought 
theory (and with externalist accounts of self-knowledge) would pre-
clude such a conclusion (for a defence of the latter, see Garfield, 
2015). The issue of cross-cultural affinity is not at stake, but rather its 
epistemic import: that is, on what ground do we concede the viability 
of one model over another? 
In his commentary, MacKenzie pursues two related questions: (i) Is 
reflexive awareness (svasaṃvedana) identical with the subjective pole 
of a dual-aspect cognition or are there alternative, perhaps better, ways 
of understanding this self-intimating character of mental states? (ii) Is 
perception constitutively intentional or is it representational? In his 
response, he suggests an alternative reading, which takes reflexivity to 
be a ‘formal and invariant feature of consciousness’, and offers a com-
pelling argument for why ‘intrinsic intentionality is perfectly con-
sistent with the logical independence of experiential objects from their 
cause’ (an account he has defended at length in MacKenzie, 2007). I 
am sympathetic to the first interpretation, but less willing to grant that 
intentional reference entails (or is compatible with) 
representationalism. 
1. Self-Awareness and Reflexivity 
MacKenzie argues that his interpretation of reflexive awareness as a 
‘formal and invariant feature of consciousness’ finds equal support in 
the literature. I agree. My only concern is with the ‘anonymity of 
mental events’ this view generally entails (see Ganeri, 2012, p. 181, 
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66 C.  COSERU 
for a similar concern). While in keeping with the principles of the 
Buddhist no-self view, his interpretation of reflexive awareness is at 
odds with what I take to be certain salient and ineliminable features of 
phenomenal consciousness: its for-me-ness and its horizon structure. 
If self-reflexively conscious episodes lack an intentional structure, 
then they cannot provide the minimal sense of internal distance 
necessary for subjectivity. On this interpretation of the reflexivity 
thesis, it is easier for critics to point out its inadequacy in discerning 
basic sensations like pain as occurring in a given mental stream (let 
alone thoughts like ‘I am in pain’). My claim, on the contrary, is that 
mental streams are differentiated by being covariant with intentional 
behaviour, which presupposes that intentionality is a structural feature 
of consciousness, rather than a relation to an external object (as 
proposed by the Indian realists, the Naiyāyikas). As I argue at length 
in §8.4 (p. 264), ‘even assuming that Dignāga has in mind a non-
objectifying or intransitive type of experience when he describes self-
awareness, something akin to the Yogācāra notion of consciousness 
only (cittamātra), or perhaps a type of primitive and pre-reflective 
self-awareness, of the sort that phenomenologists like Zahavi (2004) 
define as implicit and nonconceptual, it is still the case that this is an 
intentional experience’. The reason? A self-awareness that is not 
implicitly intentional cannot in principle serve as a necessary con-
dition for genuine ‘aboutness’. 
In Perceiving Reality I set out to trace both the phenomenological 
and dialectical roots of the dual-aspect model. I argue that this model 
grows out of attempts to come to terms with the cross-modular 
account of consciousness and cognition of the Abhidharma (I offer a 
reconstruction of the textual evidence for this view in Chapter 3). But 
it also reflects a commitment — on the part of at least some Buddhist 
thinkers — to finding common ground for certainty in a philosophical 
culture dominated by appeals to testimony (chiefly that of extra-
ordinarily accomplished individuals such as Buddhas) (see also 
Arnold, 2010; and Kellner, 2011). If the phenomenological analyses at 
work in early Abhidharma translate into a complex taxonomy of con-
scious mental states (of visual, auditory, introspective, subliminal, 
type of consciousness), then we have a way of mapping out the 
domain of phenomenal experience, the loka-saṃjñā, so as to identify 
which features are invariant. Only when these features are in place do 
concerns about their epistemic status come into play. And only then 
can we proceed to ask whether phenomena that cannot be further 
dissolved through analysis count as real. 
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Some aspects of consciousness, on this account, may be found to be 
deceptive, and this is precisely the conclusion drawn by Buddhist 
thinkers such as Asaṅga, who associates the self-referential and 
possessive uses of the first-person pronoun with ‘defiled’ or ‘afflicted’ 
mentation (kliṣṭa-manas). In such states of mind, one has both the 
experience of a sense of self and of the persistence of such a sense 
(Lamotte, 1973, p. 21; see also Dreyfus and Thompson, 2007). 
MacKenzie suggests that reflexive awareness, as a ‘formal and 
invariant structure of consciousness’, could not be conducive to such 
‘afflictive’ identification with either the subjective or objective pole of 
experience. That is, reflexive awareness simply illuminates the cog-
nitive process without itself displaying any of the dual-aspect 
characteristics of this process. On my view, ‘for-me-ness’ and 
‘intentional orientation’ are co-emergent features of consciousness 
that are constitutive of our active engagement with the situations and 
things of mundane existence (see Silberstein, 2006). 
Regardless of how the mental domain is mapped out, the sense that 
cognitive awareness is a dynamic process embedded within a complex 
system of causal and conditioning factors is precisely why I take the 
reflexivity of awareness to manifest a distinctly phenomenal character. 
The Abhidharma synthesis is predicated on an ingenious but tentative 
tripartite model of cognitive awareness sketched in the canonical 
literature. As one Middle Length Discourse puts it, what holds 
together this individual bundle of aggregates and forges a first-
personal sense of the givenness of experience are the proliferating 
tendencies (prapañca) of the ‘reasoning and deliberating’ (vitarka-
vicāra) mind. Consider this passage, which I quote in Perceiving 
Reality (p. 63): 
Dependent on the eye and forms, visual-consciousness arises. The 
meeting of the three is contact. With contact as condition there is 
feeling. What one feels, that one perceives. What one perceives, that 
one thinks about. What one thinks about, that one mentally proliferates 
(papañceti). With what one has mentally proliferated as the source, 
perception and notions resulting from mental proliferation beset a man 
with respect to past, future, and present forms cognizable through the 
eye. (Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi, 2001, p. 203) 
This formula, which is repeated in various guises throughout the 
literature, captures an important phenomenological insight: empirical 
awareness, it seems, has a discerning aspect built into it, even as the 
notion that one perceives independent spatio-temporal things (e.g. 
tables and chairs) is justly traced to unreflective habits of thought. 
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Against the prevailing tendency to proceed from metaphysical con-
siderations about what there is, the Abhidharma thus develops into a 
hybrid of naturalistic and existential phenomenology: hybrid, because 
the analysis of the elements of existence and/or experience (dharmas) 
is always embedded in a broader concern with action and agency in 
concrete situations, and with the moral consequences of these actions 
(see, for instance, Vasubandhu’s Treatise on Action in Lamotte, 
1936). At the heart of this enterprise are two seemingly irreconcilable 
notions of consciousness: (i) consciousness as sentience, and (ii) con-
sciousness as discernment. If sentience is what is ultimately meant by 
‘mind’ (citta) and discernment simply stands for the ‘mental con-
stituents’ (caitta), then we have an effective way of explaining the 
reciprocal relation between thought and its content. The experiential 
domain is then constituted as sensed textures that mould our experi-
ence and give it its qualitative aspects — the phenomenal character of 
‘what it is like’. 
But this project of reductive analysis has an unintended con-
sequence: in the formula of dependent arising just cited, which serves 
as the hallmark of the Buddhist metaphysical picture of causality, the 
awareness that arises in conjunction with the activity of a given 
sensory system is itself impermanent and momentary: visual aware-
ness and visual object, thus, are both events within a mental stream of 
continuing relations. The question that Abhidharma philosophers must 
confront is precisely what accounts for the sense of recollection that 
accompanies these cognitive series. That is, if discrete, episodic cog-
nitive events are all that constitutes the mental domain, what accounts 
for the sort of intimation we associate with being conscious? If experi-
ential episodes are indeed reflexively aware but lack subjective 
character, as MacKenzie claims, how do they achieve their epistemo-
logical goal? (See Coseru, 2009b.) 
The reflexivist dual-aspect model of consciousness put forth by 
Dignāga is in large measure conceived as a response to this problem. 
On my view, Dignāga grounds his understanding of reflexive aware-
ness in an analysis of perception precisely because he sees it as a key 
structural feature of his epistemological stance. If the interpretation I 
favour brings reflexive awareness closer to the conception of 
embodied self-awareness advanced by Merleau-Ponty, it is only 
because we are in a better position today to judge its phenomeno-
logical aptness. 
 My second objection to treating reflexive awareness as a formal 
and invariant feature of consciousness is that it dislodges it from the 
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ongoing flow of the mental stream. If reflexive awareness is a 
phenomenon simpliciter, how does it come to illuminate cognition in 
its various modalities (visual, recollective, anticipatory)? If there is an 
invariant structural feature in place that explains why grasping the pot, 
tasting the coffee, and planning for the day has this self-reflexive 
character, how are we to explain its direction of fit? MacKenzie points 
to the experience of non-dual states of consciousness as providing a 
clue to the deep phenomenology of reflexivity. I am sceptical, if only 
because I share with Paul Griffiths (1986) the worry that such non-
dual states are phenomenologically opaque, since there is nothing it is 
like to be in them while they endure. If consciousness is inherently 
intentional, something that Dignāga’s dual-aspect model evidently 
seeks to capture, then a minimal sense of mineness must be an 
ineliminable aspect of its structure. The worry has deep roots in the 
Buddhist philosophical tradition itself, and finds one of its best articu-
lations in Kamalaśīla, who rejects the claim that non-conceptual states 
of cognitive awareness lack mentation. On the contrary such states 
should be regarded, at best, as modes of insight (prajñayā) into the 
very nature of phenomena. As I write (p. 47), ‘what Kamalaśīla argues 
against is the mistaken view that meditative cultivation essentially 
amounts to casting aside all mental activity and achieving a state of 
unconsciousness (asaṃjñīsamāpatti)’ (see also Tucci, 1971, pp. 13f.; 
and Tillemans, 2013). 
2. Intentionality and Perception 
The second issue concerns the question whether perception is 
intentionally constituted (see Coseru, 2009a; 2015), and whether some 
of the structural features of the dual-aspect theory fit Husserl’s 
analysis of the noema or the object as intended. MacKenzie agrees 
that such a reading is possible, but that it gets complicated when we 
prise apart embodied agency and the first-person perspective. The 
latter, in his view, is something one has simply by virtue of adopting a 
standpoint, whereas embodied agency tracks closely the coping skills 
one develops in response to various practical needs (e.g. crossing a 
busy intersection, running to catch a train, etc.). 
More importantly, MacKenzie questions whether my analogy 
between the phenomenological notion of noema and the concept of 
ākāra (‘aspect’ or ‘phenomenal form’) is tenable given Dignāga’s pre-
sumed representationalism about perception. On his interpretation, for 
the Buddhist epistemologists ‘perception is direct in that it is non-
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70 C.  COSERU 
inferential, but it is indirect in the more relevant respect that what is 
immediately grasped in perception is the ākāra, which is a) mental, 
and b) logically independent of the cause of the perceptual experi-
ence’. If perception grasps mental aspects that are logically 
independent from the causes of perceptual experience, why does 
Dignāga insist on treating cognitions and their sources as undiffer-
entiated? Dignāga’s statement, which I quote on p. 247, makes this 
point amply obvious: ‘we do not admit, as the realists do, that the 
resulting cognition (pramāṇaphala) differs from the accredited source 
of cognition (pramāṇa).’ That is, the pot is apprehended only as 
grasped, the blue sky only as seen. As Dignāga further clarifies, it is 
only because ‘the resulting cognition arises bearing in itself the aspect 
of the cognized object’ (p. 247) that it serves as an epistemic warrant. 
This resulting cognition (say, as of an earthen pot) does bear formal 
resemblance to the object that is apprehended, but we have no direct 
access to the complex array of causal and conditional factors that are 
constitutive of it. As such, cognition is effectively nothing but 
reflexive awareness itself in its twofold appearance as subjective and 
objective aspects. 
Consider the sensation of pain. Rather: one is in pain, and the pain is 
of a particular type; burning, stinging, or throbbing. This account of 
cognition raises an important question: how do we know that 
cognition has this two-aspectual character? As I write (p. 247), 
‘Dignāga’s answer is quite categorical: because object-cognition with-
out self-cognition and self-cognition without object-cognition would 
otherwise be indistinguishable’ (see Hattori, 1968, p. 30). 
MacKenzie worries that taking reflexive awareness to be intentional 
is problematic because intentionality implies a subject–object 
distinction and reflexive awareness lacks such a distinction. However, 
if reflexivity lacks this dual-aspect structure, how is ‘character’ differ-
entiated from ‘content’, that is, assuming each has a distinctive and 
proprietary phenomenology? Taking the subjective aspect to reflect 
self-ascription or some kind of internal monitoring, and the objective 
aspect directness toward some empirical object or property of some 
kind would not suffice (see Peacocke, 2010, for a similar view with 
regard to contemporary debates about the character of self-awareness). 
An externalist, relational determination of the structure of awareness 
is precisely what the dual-aspect theory seeks to counter. If the 
determination of mental content is a relational feature, a sort of iso-
morphic coupling of causal factors and phenomenal form, then 
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reflexivity is simply a product or outcome of a certain type of material 
organization typical of biological organisms. 
Take MacKenzie’s example of the music CD: the information 
encoded on a CD need not qualitatively resemble the music. True, but 
the information encoding process does qualitatively resemble the 
music, as does the information decoding process. We call it a ‘music 
CD’ only as a manner of speech. It is a part, and an inessential one at 
that, of music recording and broadcasting technologies, where the 
medium is electromagnetic signals rather than air or string vibrations. 
Music scores don’t qualitatively resemble music either. Their inter-
pretation does. 
3. Aspects and Body Schema 
On the problems of aspects (ākāra) and body schema, MacKenzie 
thinks my analogy fails. He points out that Gallagher takes the body 
schema to act as a pre-noetic system of processes that constantly regu-
lates posture and movement, that is, a system of sensory-motor 
capacities and actualities that function without the necessity of 
perceptual monitoring. Indeed, that is what Gallagher says, but that’s 
only half the story. As Gallagher explains in his account of the 
negative phenomenology of movement, ‘that a body schema operates 
in a prenoetic way means that it does not depend on a consciousness 
that… monitors bodily movement’ (Gallagher, 2006, p. 32) Gallagher 
is quite clear that ‘this is not to say that it does not depend on con-
sciousness at all’ (ibid, p. 32). He gives us the example of embodied 
action that does require a basic perceptual awareness. In reaching out 
across the room to pull a book out of my library and show you a 
passage, I am implicitly aware of the furniture in the room, objects on 
the floor to avoid, and so on. My attention is focused on the book and 
the passage I have in mind to show you, and only minimally on my 
motor skills. So, says Gallagher (ibid., p. 32): ‘My consciousness of 
the environment and of the location of things I need to reach will 
guide my movement… In that sense consciousness is essential for the 
operation of the body schema.’ 
If consciousness is essential for the operation of the body schema, 
then the body schema is not entirely an automatic system of processes 
that provide structural scaffolding for experience. Its operations 
instead depend on the intentional and qualitative dimensions of con-
scious cognition. Consider fear or surprise. There is no such thing as 
fear or surprise simpliciter; rather, there is fear in the face of impend-
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72 C.  COSERU 
ing danger and surprise at the electoral outcomes. The body schema 
offers a better analogy for the constitutive aspects of bodily awareness 
because it avoids many of the problems representationalist accounts of 
embodied consciousness face. 
I do not mean to suggest that ākāra-s cannot be interpreted as 
mental images, internal aspects that represent various features of 
experience. Indeed, it seems to be a prevailing view among many 
scholars of Buddhist philosophy. The problem with this interpretation 
is that it renders our embodied condition metaphysically unintelli-
gible. The sense of embodied agency that is characteristic of per-
ceptual states of cognitive awareness is not present via localizable 
sensations in the body or spatio-temporal location, since embodiment 
is what makes possible the attribution of such features in the first 
place. 
Anand Vaidya 
I find the question of compatibility between Buddhist philosophy and 
Husserlian phenomenology that Vaidya raises fascinating, but 
Perceiving Reality is a study in neither phenomenological ontology 
nor analytic metaphysics, so I will focus on what he calls the ‘prima 
facie tension between some important themes Husserl holds to and the 
views of… [the] Buddhist thinkers’ I examine. 
Vaidya thinks that, in so far as Husserlian phenomenology and 
Buddhism differ in terms of their fundamental ontological commit-
ments, they must be incompatible, thus rendering any cross-cultural 
philosophical project that seeks their rapprochement tenuous. He then 
proceeds to offer a reading of Husserl’s work under which particular 
versions of essentialism and epistemological realism ‘are coarse-grain 
incompatible with the thrust of the kind of Buddhism found in 
Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla’. In his analysis Vaidya 
wonders whether the logic of the three Buddhist doctrines of 
dependent arising, impermanence, and momentariness support the 
notion that knowledge entails the apprehension of things as essentially 
characterized. 
In order to address this issue, I will first compare Husserl’s method 
of imaginative variation as the vehicle for his account of eidetic 
essences with the Buddhist analysis of elements of existence and/or 
experience (dharma-s). I will then examine the specific ways in which 
the principles of momentariness and dependent arising entail the 
Buddhist epistemologists’ account of particulars. This examination 
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also affords an opportunity to consider once again the reflexive theory 
of consciousness, and whether Husserl’s argument from Time-
Consciousness is helpful in foregrounding the notion that perceptual 
awareness of an object is pre-reflectively and intransitively self-
conscious. Some of the conclusions I draw here reflect on issues I 
address in my reply to Guerrero, particularly with regard to the diffi-
culties that theories of perception informed by metaphysical realism 
confront. 
1. On Husserl’s Method of Eidetic Variation and Buddhist Non-
essentialism 
In Experience and Judgment, §87, Husserl (1973) describes how the 
method of ‘essential seeing’, as he conceives it, enables the discovery 
of eidetic essences. An ‘eidetic essence’, as he understands it, is that 
which belongs to an entity invariantly: in short, its ‘what’ (Was) or 
‘whatness’ (Washeit). In so far as Husserl speaks of phenomenology 
as a science of eidetic essences, he has in mind neither abstract entities 
nor the substrata of things, but invariant features, specifically those 
features that set objects apart from things. If being a thing means 
being defined in terms of spatio-temporal properties, being an object 
is essentially being an intentional object of some kind. One discovers 
what belongs to an entity invariantly using the method of eidetic or 
imaginative variation. 
Quoting a long passage from Experience and Judgment that 
describes this method, Vaidya concludes that Husserl is thus com-
mitted ‘to the existence of essences and to the possibility of human 
knowledge of them’. But Husserl’s account of eidetic variation does 
not target essences as independent of thought. Rather, he is concerned 
with uncovering the structural features of experiential phenomena that 
empiricism had left unexplained. Using eidetic variation, I can 
imagine a tree stripped of its particular qualities, located here rather 
than there, as seen from this or that side, and with this or that foliage 
colour. What I cannot do is imagine the tree as having only one side 
(that is, as lacking a back), for that would constitute a violation of the 
object. This process, Husserl is clear to emphasize, is not one of 
abstraction, but of discovering what that object is essentially about: its 
‘whatness’ (incidentally, Searle, 2015, p. 150, seems to be making a 
similar point when, in his defence of perceptual holism, he notes that 
‘being a tree is not a basic perceptual feature’). Furthermore, what is 
thus discovered as belonging to an entity invariantly is not 
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74 C.  COSERU 
independent of its mode of ascertainment. Eidetic variation also 
reveals something fundamental about the structure of experience 
itself. 
Perhaps the most salient aspect of this account of eidetic variation is 
the recognition that real things, unlike invariants, are subject to altera-
tion, which Husserl understands as ‘a continual being-other or, rather, 
a becoming other and yet being the same, individually the same, in 
this continual becoming-other’ (Husserl, 1973, p. 347). In other 
words, things undergo constant transformation even as they maintain 
the appearance of sameness. Unlike objects, which are formally 
understood as the bearers of properties, things are always apprehended 
in profiles or what Husserl calls ‘adumbrations’. Indeed, it is part of 
the essence of perceptual objects that they always reveal themselves in 
‘profiles’. A tree can only be seen from one specific perspective. It is 
not only things that reveal themselves in endless perceptual profiles; 
each sensory modality likewise is given in profiles. I can both see the 
ambulance driving by and hear it from a distance as it approaches. 
Notice, however, that the thing itself is strictly speaking never seen. 
Rather, the thing is disclosed as an endless series of appearances. As 
Husserl explains in Crisis, §47, ‘“The” thing itself is actually that 
which no one experiences as really seen, since it is always in motion, 
always, and for everyone, a unity for consciousness of the openly 
endless multiplicity of changing experiences and experienced 
things…’ (Husserl, 1970, p. 164). 
2. Profiles, Moments, and Things 
How does this reading of eidetic variation square with the Buddhist 
account of cognitive awareness, now that it is clear that Husserl is 
concerned with the world as experienced, as pre-thematically given? 
First, consider this passage from The Connected Discourses of the 
Buddha, which I quote in Perceiving Reality (p. 66): 
That is the world by which one is a perceiver of the world, a conceiver 
of the world — this is called the world in the Noble One’s Discipline. 
And what, friends, is that in the world by which one is a perceiver of the 
world, a conceiver of the world? The eye is that in the world by which 
one is a perceiver of the world, a conceiver of the world. The ear… The 
nose… The tongue… The body… The mind is that in the world by 
which one is a perceiver of the world, a conceiver of the world. (Bodhi, 
2000, p. 1190) 
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As I explain in Perceiving Reality, what we come across here is the 
picture of a fluctuating world in which entities and the cognitive 
modalities in which they are disclosed exist only as aggregated 
phenomena of experience. That visual, aural, and mental profiles 
would exist ‘in the world by which one is a perceiver’ is, I claim, akin 
to Husserl’s account of adumbration. The elements or specific profiles 
that are constitutive of experience, however, ‘are not simply the 
counterparts of corresponding physical objects, since what lies outside 
the sphere of perception is always already constituted by the dynamic 
structures of our cognitive architecture’ (p. 67). 
Furthermore, this conception of the body (with its sensory organs) 
as both the medium of contact with the world and the world with 
which it comes in contact is not unlike Husserl’s account of the body 
as revealed through phenomenological reduction (epoché) — as both a 
biological entity (Körper) connected to the continuum of life, and as 
the medium for the expression of life (Leib). An analogy to the notion 
of a lived world is at work in the Buddhist view that body, mind, and 
world arise in dependence upon each other. The principle of 
dependent arising captures precisely this notion. What is thus meant 
by ‘world’ in the Buddhist Abhidharma context is not an external 
domain of entities and relations, but the ‘phenomenal world of experi-
ence’ (lokasaṃjñā). 
It should be obvious that pressing Husserl’s account of the lived 
world, in the service of unpacking the Buddhist view that mind and 
world are co-constituted, has its virtues, and there is much that can be 
learned by bringing these two traditions of thought together. However, 
there are also important tensions both within and between these 
traditions of thought about the nature, scope, and limits of first-person 
methods. If Abhidharma philosophers share with Husserl (as well as 
William James, Franz Brentano, and others) the view that the study of 
mind must be experientially grounded, the question what precisely 
that grounding entails is not as straightforward. 
Consider the Buddhist view that disciplined forms of moral and 
mental cultivation are capable of revealing not only the content and 
character of mental states, but also the invariant relations and 
properties these states have (see pp. 43–50). One such property is 
causal determination: mental states never arise in isolation from each 
other. Another is duration: mental states do not last for more than a 
moment. Like a streaming river, thought too is said to be in constant 
flux (de la Vallée Poussin, 1971, p. 69). While Husserl agrees that the 
stream of consciousness flows on, he thinks that time-consciousness 
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76 C.  COSERU 
actually has a tripartite structure. Each instance of consciousness is 
characterized by primal impression, retention, and protension. In 
hearing a sound (the primal impression), there is at once recognition 
of its tonality (retention) and openness toward what is yet to be heard 
(protension). Time-consciousness, in other words, has an aspectual 
shape (see Husserl, 1991, §11, §24). 
Abhidharma accounts about the duration of each moment of con-
sciousness vary significantly, with some texts giving fixed estimates 
(e.g. 120) of how many basic moments there are in an instant — 
roughly the time it takes to blink or snap one’s fingers — while others 
leave the question open or venture numbers of many orders of 
magnitude (e.g. billions) (see de la Vallée Poussin, 1971, pp. 70f.; 
Bodhi, 1993, p. 156; and Dreyfus and Thompson, 2007). The presence 
of varying estimates for the duration of a mind moment in the 
Abhidharma literature suggests that, while the Buddhist principle of 
momentariness is grounded in a basic introspective awareness of 
change, precise estimations are at best speculative. 
In Perceiving Reality I am not concerned with such speculative 
questions about the measurable duration of a mind moment, but with 
issues surrounding the question of whether simultaneity is a con-
ceptual construct or something that is given in perception. Consider 
this passage by Kamalaśīla, which I quote in Perceiving Reality (p. 
174): 
…[I]f despite numerous intervening sensory conditions, the illusion of 
the simultaneity of sensory cognition becomes manifest due to the quick 
succession in which cognitions arise; then, in the case of syllables heard 
in rapid succession as, for instance, when one hears the words latā and 
tāla or sara and rāsa together, as though resulting from rapidly inter-
vening cognitions, the two words sara-rāsa appear simultaneously 
when heard. Thus there should be neither an auditory recognition of two 
separate words nor an apprehension of the two different objects they 
denote… [A]s all cognitions are momentary, because they occur in 
quick succession, they cannot endure for any length of time, so that no 
cognition of succession for any object is [ever] apprehended. (Shastri, 
1968, pp. 459f.) 
The question raised here is whether in perception we apprehend a 
cluster of sensation simultaneously or serially. If the principle of 
momentariness is true and things do endure for only a moment, how 
can there be cognition of simultaneity? Yes, without the capacity to 
grasp at once a string of sounds, one could not discern any rhythm or 
melodic structure. In my discussion, I make the case for considering 
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the phenomenon of perceptual binding, which explains how sensory 
input, which is aggregated through a process of selection and grouping 
in the somatosensory cortex, comes to be correlated with a distinct 
subjective awareness. As I claim (p. 175), ‘in the case of hearing, 
simultaneity occurs when a sequence of two acoustic cues, such as 
two syllables above a certain threshold, are perceived not as separate 
but as a single phonetic event’ (see also Pessoa, Thompson and Noë, 
1998). In rejecting the notion that ‘simultaneity’ is a real feature of 
perceived objects, while acknowledging its seeming character, the 
Buddhists, I claim, put forward something akin to a sensorimotor 
account of phenomenal experience: perception is not something that 
happens to us, rather it is something that we do (see Clark, 1998; 
Hurley, 1998; Matthen, 2004; Noë, 2004). This dependency of the 
perceived on the perceiver’s orientation and disposition is what 
occasions the illusion of simultaneity when an untrained perceiver 
fails to account for, as Kamalaśīla notes, ‘the numerous intervening 
sensory conditions’. 
2. Consciousness and Causality 
Vaidya is right to note that there is a tension between the Buddhist 
doctrines of impermanence and momentariness: if the mental stream is 
discontinuous and our awareness of things is itself momentary, what 
factors are responsible for the persistence of an object over time? He 
constructs an argument (‘from perishability’) for the view that, even 
assuming the thesis of momentariness, essential properties are 
necessary for individuating entities. Combined with his reading of 
Husserl’s conception of eidetic essences as extra-mental but not 
physical, Vaidya then offers two concluding arguments: the first 
targeting, again, the ontological incompatibility of Husserlian 
phenomenology and Buddhist epistemology, and the second the 
incompatibility of momentariness and essentialism. 
Using Husserl’s method of eidetic variation, argues Vaidya, we can 
learn that an object, say a cup, has spatial extension, but not ‘that it is 
extended in space for a moment [original emphasis]’. But as I already 
noted above, the distinction between objects and things is important in 
assessing the compatibility of the two accounts. Momentariness is a 
statement about the nature of phenomena in so far as they arise in 
dependence upon causes and conditions. But this nature is not 
assessed independently of its mode of givenness. That an object is 
extended in space for any length of time is a statement about time-
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consciousness, not a description of the object’s temporal features. And 
whereas there is no agreement in the Buddhist tradition about what 
serves as the immediately antecedent condition for the arising of a 
moment of consciousness, there is agreement about the persistence of 
objects in conceptual analysis. 
Consider this passage from Vasubandhu, which I quote in 
Perceiving Reality (p. 206): 
When the apprehension of an entity persists after that entity has been 
reduced through conceptual analysis, that entity exists ultimately, e.g., 
form: while form may be reduced to atoms, and while we may exclude 
from it through cognitive analysis other qualia (such as taste, etc.), the 
apprehension of the proper nature of form persists. Feelings too are to 
be understood [as ultimately true]. (Pradhan, 1975, p. 334) 
Vasubandhu’s argument is that entities that can be either physically 
fragmented or dissolved in conceptual analysis are not ultimately real, 
unlike the elements of existence (dharma-s), which are. Examples of 
the latter include a whole typology of mental states, and their specific 
characteristics. But if Vasubandhu understands the ‘real’ in this 
ontological sense, the Buddhist epistemologists describe in pragmatic 
terms. Entities that are changeless and enduring cannot produce any 
effect. This is essentially the conclusion drawn by Dharmakīrti, who 
in articulating a conception of reality in terms of causal efficacy — 
essentially the ability of an object to perform a function — departs 
from Vasubandhu’s view that only partless entities are ultimately real. 
As perceptual objects, particulars represent (in the sense of ‘making 
present’) the defining characteristics of individual entities. As I have 
claimed (p. 211), ‘the particular is a sort of uniquely characterized 
phenomenon accessible only through a perceptual cognition, and 
serving as the latter’s noematic content (viz., the perceived as such). 
For the Buddhist epistemologists, then, the particular is not simply 
internal, uniquely characterized sense-data but veridical, non-
conceptual content’. 
3. Eidetic Variation and the Perceived as Such 
On Vaidya’s reading of eidetic variation, when imagining a cup as 
having different properties I can only do so if ‘the variation on the 
object remains the same in time through certain variations and 
perishes at another time through other variations’. For that reason, the 
object on which the variations are done cannot be momentary. But this 
reading of eidetic variation assumes a bifurcation of act and content 
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that the phenomenological method does not support. When Husserl 
claims that experience extends the boundaries of the given, con-
straining ‘our reason to go beyond intuitionally given physical things’ 
(Husserl, 1983, p. 105), he does not mean these boundaries are 
temporally extended. Rather, he is simply making a statement about 
the mutual tripartite constitutiveness of object intended, intentional 
act, and the structureless given. The cup is present only so long as it is 
intended as such. 
The Buddhist epistemologists too invoke the holistic character of 
cognition, in which the particular is present as a structureless whole. 
Consider this passage from Dignāga’s Collection on the Sources of 
Knowledge, which I cite on p. 200: 
It is mentioned in the Abhidharma treatise that ‘these sense-cognitions 
take a unique particular as their object insofar as it is the particular in 
the form of a cognizable sense-sphere and not in the form of a 
constituent substance [viz. an atom].’ How is this to be understood? In 
the Abhidharma passages cited above, that perception, being caused by 
the sense-organ through its contact with many aggregated entities, takes 
the whole as the object of its sphere of operation. Since perception is 
caused by the sense organ through its contact with many substances 
[viz., aggregates of atoms], it is said, in respect to its sphere of opera-
tion, that it takes the whole as its object. (see Hattori, 1968, pp. 26f.) 
In mapping out the structure of cognition, Dignāga, it seems, quite 
clearly identifies the horizon structure that discloses both the particu-
lar aspect of the object as experienced and the perceiver’s intentional 
stance. I perceive colour because I am sensitive to light. 
As I argue in Perceiving Reality, the Buddhist epistemological 
account of perception captures the intent of Husserl’s distinction 
between the data of the inherent noetic content (the qualia of experi-
ence, e.g. this particular shade of blue) and the data of the noematic 
content (the thing perceived as perceived, e.g. blue sky as seen). For 
the Buddhist, perceptual awareness represents a constantly new intro-
duction to an object: what is genuinely seen is always foregrounded 
by what is merely co-present. Thus, when Buddhists argue that a 
misunderstanding of the capacity and function of direct perception can 
result in a failure to grasp the implications of the causal principle of 
dependent arising, they have in mind a similar analysis of the 
perceptual event. As I make quite clear (p. 144), from a Buddhist 
standpoint, ‘any attempt to define perception as the activity of forming 
perceptual judgments, the result of which is the apprehension of 
external objects as characterized by stable physical properties, runs 
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80 C.  COSERU 
counter to the view (taken to be axiomatic by the Buddhist), that 
things and the cognitive events that instantiate them are episodic and 
relational’. 
While the Buddhist epistemologists are committed, like all Buddhist 
thinkers, to a view of phenomena as episodic and relational, they 
advance a theory of the unity of consciousness as reflexive awareness, 
which allows them to explain how the world, with its fundamental 
structure, is self-disclosed in consciousness. 
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